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A crucial turning point in Russell’s philosophy came in the early 1910s when he embraced A.N.Whitehead’s suggestion that the application of logicist methods should be extended beyond the domain of mathematics to that of physics (see Russell 1918, 156-157). Following the success that logical constructions of mathematical objects had in Principia Mathematica, the idea of utilising logic to define the objects of physics seemed quite appealing. Employing such logical constructions with sense-data - the allegedly pure objects of our perception - as the logical atoms had the obvious advantage of eliminating doubtful inferences to physical objects, the nature of which, as Kant had argued, would remain forever unknown to us. By 1921 Russell had assigned the role of logical atoms to events, the more neutral, neither decidedly physical nor decidedly mental, elements that fitted nicely with his newly discovered affection for neutral monism. Moreover, he had assigned the role of the objects of direct acquaintance to percepts, those events that occurred within one’s head. Despite these shifts, Russell’s commitment to the project of logical construction remained firm.
 
It was not until The Analysis of Matter (1927) that Russell wholeheartedly embraced and developed the structural viewpoint.​[1]​ There he presented a causal theory of perception and argued that it is both reasonable and fruitful to assume the existence of causes (i.e. events) external to our mind admitting however that we should “not expect to find a demonstration that perceptions have external causes” (198) [my emphasis]. He then argued that though we have direct knowledge of the ‘intrinsic character’, ‘nature’ or ‘quality’ i.e. the first order properties and relations, of percepts, the same does not hold for events in the external world. The only way we attain knowledge of the latter is by drawing inferences from our perceptions. Assuming that similar causes (i.e. events) have similar effects (i.e. percepts) – a roughly one-one correspondence between stimulus and percept – Russell argues that relations between effects mirror relations between causes. Thus, from the structure of our perceptions we can “infer a great deal as to the structure of the physical world, but not as to its intrinsic character” (400). At most what can be known is the logical form or structure i.e. the second or higher order properties and relations of events in the external world. 

But what exactly did Russell mean by ‘structure’ when he said that we can infer the structure of the external world from the structure of our perceptions? Talk of ‘structure’ or ‘relation-number’ – Russell uses these terms interchangeably – is invariably talk of the structure of a relation or of a system of relations – this latter notion signifying one or more relations defined over a single domain. The structure of a relation is simply “the class of relations similar to the given relation” (250). Russell employs the notion of ‘similar relations’, i.e. isomorphic relations, to convey the idea that we are interested only in the formal features of a relation and not the relation itself for we have no direct access to it. 

2. Newman’s Bifurcated Challenge
In 1928, one year after the publication of Russell’s The Analysis of Matter, M.H.A. Newman, a famed mathematician and later-to-become Bletchley Park collaborator, published a paper in which he argued that the SR claim that we can know only the structure of the external world is, as it stands, either trivial or false. Newman’s paper went almost unnoticed in the ensuing decades, until Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) brought it back to the limelight. But let us take a closer look at the challenge.

The First Fork: SR is Trivial
Newman begins by noting that Russell’s view, that we have no knowledge of the physical relations over and above their formal (i.e. structural) features, amounts to the assertion that “[t]here is a relation R such that the structure of the external world with reference to R is W” (1928, 144). He then urges us to consider the logical theorem that for “any aggregate A, a system of relations between its members can be found having any assigned structure compatible with the cardinal number of A” (140). According to this theorem, the mere number of members in an aggregate entails that there are systems of relations definable over those members having a specified structure. Thus saying, as structural realists do, that for a given class there exists a system of relations that specifies a structure, is not saying much since this claim follows as a matter of logic by employing the above noted theorem plus the cardinality of the given class. But surely knowing something about the external world must be discoverable empirically, not a-priori. Yet the only thing open for empirical determination under Russell’s view, according to Newman’s argument, is the cardinality of the given class.

We can present Newman’s result more formally but before doing so we need to set up a couple of definitions:

Definition 1: For any set U and any n  1 an n-place relation on U is a set of ordered n-tuples (1, …,n) where each i is a member of U, i.e. an n-place relation-in-extension on U is a subset of Un.

Definition 2: A (concrete) structure S = (U, R1, …., Rm) is specified by:
(i)	a non-empty set U (the domain of S); 
(ii)	a non-empty set of relations R1, …., Rm on U.

Definition 3: A structure S = (U, R1, …., Rm) is isomorphic to a structure T = (U, R1, …., Rm) just in case there is a bijection : U  U such that for all x1, …,xn in U, (x1,…,xn) satisfies the relation Ri in U iff ((x1),…,(xn)) satisfies the corresponding relation Ri in U. 

Definition 4: An abstract structure  is an isomorphism class (or “isomorphism type”) whose members are all, and only those, structures that are isomorphic to some given structure (U, R1, …., Rm). (Note: This is what Russell claims we have knowledge of.)
 
We can now state the theorem upon which Newman’s result is based: 

Newman’s theorem: Let S = (U, R1, …., Rk) be a structure and V be a set. Suppose that there is an injection : U  V. Then, there exists a structure S whose domain is V and which has a substructure isomorphic to S.
The proof for this theorem can be given as follows:​[2]​ We begin by defining the image of mapping  as (U) := {x  V:   U, () =x}. From this we know that (U)  V and since  is injective we know that : U   (U) is a bijection. Its inverse is thus, -1: (U)  U. We can now define a relation Ri, for each n-place relation Ri on U, on the set (U) as follows: Ri:= {(x1, …,xn)  Vn : x1, …,xn  (U)  (-1 (x1), …, -1(xn))  Ri}. In other words, Ri is an n-place relation on V. Note that it follows from the definition of each Ri that 1, …,n​  U, ((1), …,(n))  Ri iff (1, …,n)  Ri. This is the condition for an isomorphism. By repeating this for every relation Ri on U we define relations Ri on V and hence have a structure S = (V, R1, …., Rk). If we now take the restriction of S to the subdomain (U)  V we observe that it is just the substructure ((U), R1, …., Rk) which is isomorphic to S, i.e. ((U), R1, …., Rk)  S. This just means that save for cardinality constraints we can impose any structure on a set; that structure being of course set up by some relation(s). Thus, saying that ‘There exists a relation R which has a specified structure S’ is not saying much since that follows trivially modulo cardinality constraints.

The Second Fork: SR is False
Newman correctly points out “that it is meaningless to speak of the structure of a mere collection of things, not provided with a set of relations” and “[t]hus the only important statements about structure are those concerned with the structure set up … by a given, definite, relation” (ibid.). The only way to avoid trivialization, according to him, is by specifying the particular relation(s) that generate(s) a given structure. That is, if we specify R, instead of just saying ‘There is a relation R that has a certain structure W’, the fact that R has structure W is no longer trivial. The problem is that to specify R, one inevitably goes beyond the epistemic commitments of the structural realist i.e. SR is rendered false.

Let us remind ourselves of the structural realist’s epistemic commitments. Russell claims that we can at most know the second order structure of physical relations but not the relations themselves for we have no epistemic access to them. A consequence of this view is that there is an underdetermination of the first-order physical relations by the abstract structure, since to any such structure correspond infinitely many such relations. For some this is the essence of Newman’s problem. Ladyman certainly thinks so when he says:  “[t]here are serious difficulties… which were raised by Newman (1928)… the basic problem [being] that structure is not sufficient to uniquely pick out any relations in the world” (1998, 412). To explain the objection better, consider first the following example (taken out of context from Newman’s paper) that illustrates two different relations that share the same abstract structure:

Let a set, A, of objects be given, and a relation R which holds between certain subsets of A. Let B be a second set of objects, also provided with a relation S which holds between certain subsets of its members… For example A might be a random collection of people, and R the two-termed relation of being acquainted. A map of A can be made by making a dot on a piece of paper to represent each person, and joining with a line those pairs of dots which represent acquainted persons. Such a map is itself a system, B, having the same structure as A, the generating relation, S, in this case being “joined by a line”. (1928, 139)

Newman, like most mathematicians, tends to avoid using different symbols for a set and for some structure with that set as domain, since it is usually clear from the context what he is referring to. For the sake of clarity we shall use asterisks to indicate a structure as opposed to the set that constitutes the structure’s domain. Thus, structure A* and structure B* have set A and set B respectively as their domain. The two relations, ‘being acquainted’ and ‘joined by a line’, are undoubtedly distinct from one another both intensionally (i.e. what they mean differs) and extensionally (i.e. what they denote differs). In this context, however, they are employed in such a way so that the structures they give rise to are isomorphic to one another, hence they share the same abstract structure. Now suppose that we are interested in only one of these relations but we have epistemic access to neither. If all we have knowledge of is abstract structure, as the structural realist suggests, we cannot distinguish between the two relations. And, of course, we do not just have two relations to choose from but infinitely many since there can be infinitely many bijective mappings that preserve the same structural properties.

Newman explores several ways in which the structural realist may try to distinguish between intended and unintended relations, two of which stand out. The first one is an attempt to dress the distinction as one between real and fictitious relations. Newman defines a relation as fictitious when “the relation is one whose only property is that it holds between the objects that it does hold between” (145). Real relations can then be implicitly defined as those relations that have more than just this property. This, according to Newman, is obviously not going to be of help since the only knowledge a structural realist would have of the real relations is exactly the same knowledge he would have of the fictitious ones, viz. that they hold between some objects. But what if we know something about these objects apart from their having a given structure, could we not then claim to have a way to distinguish the real relations from the fictitious ones? For instance, if we fix the domain in the above example to the set A, i.e. the set whose members are people, then, at least prima facie, there is no longer a question of being unable to distinguish between the two relations ‘being acquainted’ and ‘being joined by a line’.   

Anticipating this reply, Newman argues that even if the domain of the objects has been specified we are still left with the problem that we must “distinguish between systems of relations that hold among members of a given aggregate” (147) [my emphasis]. Demopoulos and Friedman elaborate that “[t]his is a difficulty because there is always a relation with the [same] structure” (1985, 628-629). This point can be extended by showing that isomorphic relations defined over the same domain can yet be different in some important respects. Example: Suppose we make another mapping of A by painting a line between all, and only those, people that are acquainted. Let us call the resulting structure ‘C*’ and its generating relation ‘T’. Notice that C* is isomorphic to A*, which means that they share the same abstract structure, let us call it ‘S*’. Notice also that C* and A* have the same set of objects as their domain, viz. set A. However, A* and C* are generated by different relations – at least if these relations are considered as relations-in-intension. A* is generated by R while C* is generated by T. Thus, knowing the abstract structure S* and fixing the domain to set A does not allow us to uniquely pick out the so-called intended relation, whatever that relation may be. But surely being able to point to the intended relation must be an essential part of scientific enterprise and knowledge.
 
Newman’s other attempt to distinguish between intended and unintended relations takes the form of a distinction between important and unimportant (or trivial) relations. But how is this distinction to be made, Newman asks, if we are to “compare the importance of relations of which nothing is known save their incidence (the same for all of them) in a certain aggregate” (147). The only way to do that without giving up SR, Newman reasons, would be to take the term ‘importance’ as one of “the prime unanalyzable qualities of the constituents of the world”, something he considers completely absurd (ibid.).

Newman concludes that if we are to avoid trivialization we must surrender “the ‘structure/quality’ division of knowledge in its strict form” (ibid.). But to surrender this distinction is to render Russell’s SR false. As Demopoulos and Friedman explain “since it is indisputably true that our knowledge of structure is non-trivial – we clearly do not stipulate the holding of the structural properties our theories have – it cannot be the case that our knowledge of the unperceived parts of the world is purely structural” (630). 

3. Russell’s Concession
Shortly after the publication of Newman’s paper, Russell wrote him a letter acknowledging that he was wrong in saying that only the structure of the physical world can be known (see Russell 1968, 176). Russell abandoned pure SR in his subsequent work (see for example Russell 1948), and never returned to address Newman’s problem.

4. Modern Structural Realists
In recent years the ranks of SR have been growing. Most converts have their own idiosyncratic version of the theory (see, for example, Maxwell 1966, 1970a, 1970b; Worrall 1989, 1994; Redhead 1990, 2001; French 1998, 1999, forthcoming; Ladyman 1998a, forthcoming; Chakravartty 1998). Beyond realism, even empiricists have expressed interest in the ‘structural’ aspect of SR with Bas van Fraassen (1997, forthcoming) and Otávio Bueno (1999, 2000) branding their anti-realist view ‘empiricist structuralism’ and ‘structural empiricism’ respectively. From all of these, the ‘epistemological’ variety of structural realists (i.e. Grover Maxwell, Howard Stein, John Worrall, Michael Redhead and Elie Zahar), share so much with Russell’s SR that it comes as no surprise that Newman’s objection would be dusted off and pitted against them. One of the main differences between Russell and his modern counterparts is that the latter have traded talk about ‘events’ and ‘percepts’ for talk about ‘entities’ and ‘observation terms/statements’, something that we will also be doing for the rest of this paper. Maxwell (1970a) has legitimised this move by pointing out that Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description has strong affinities with the distinction between observation and theory that modern structural realists rely on. 

5.  Solution
What will be argued for in this section is that upon closer scrutiny the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish in what way SR knowledge claims are un-informative. Moreover, it will be argued that the idea that we can uniquely pick out physical relations or indeed their relata is based on a myth.

First of all, it should be admitted that if all the structural realist is arguing for is the idea that there exists a relation with a particular structure then this is obviously uninformative since it holds merely by appeal to the definition of the concept of structure. But the structural realist is saying something more than this. He is saying that we have an empirically identified abstract structure that is, of course, instantiated by many concrete structures (and hence relations). One of these concrete structures represents the physical system under consideration, i.e. the system that is the subject of our observations.

Is the above claim trivial? Before we can answer this question we first need to understand what exactly is meant by the characterisation that SR knowledge claims are trivial? Usually, by the term ‘trivial’ we mean that the information on offer is of little or no importance. This, of course, is an issue whose evaluation depends on the criteria employed. So, in what way are the knowledge claims of SR of little worth or importance? The well-rehearsed answer is that the information they offer can also be derived a-priori from set theory modulo a cardinality constraint, hence the only important information contained in the structural claims concerns the cardinality of the domain. This seems to imply that any information contained in a statement that is also derivable a-priori lacks importance.
There is a very simple and straightforward reply to this, which can be given with the following example: Take the numbers 133 and 123. I can, restricting myself solely to arithmetic, perform various operations on these numbers. One such operation is addition. Similarly, if I had two collections of 133 and 123 physical objects respectively, I could count them one by one and would reach the same result. Despite the similarities, there is an important difference between the two cases. The latter case is one in which the result is a property that is then ascribed to the physical world and not merely an exercise of arithmetic. The empirical process by which I arrived at the given number warrants me to say that this is a property of the physical world. The main point is quite simple: The fact that arithmetic allows me to do this a-priori does not mean that the information that I have reached counting objects is of little or no importance. One need only consider the consequences had I made an error in counting. 

The same argument can be applied to the SR case. Provided that we have the right cardinality we can set up any structure we want a-priori just by appealing to the theorems of set theory and logic. But we can also reach the same structure a-posteriori. Science leads us to the discovery of relations between observables, and these, via principles that are questionable but not the target of Newman’s problem, allow us to derive abstract structures. The method of arriving at the abstract structure is at least partly empirical. The fact that set theory also allows me to derive the same structures a-priori does not mean that the information I have reached is devoid of importance.

For those not impressed by the arithmetic example, we can always point out, that mathematicians have often derived (a-priori) many abstract structures that have been independently postulated and empirically verified by physicists. One often mentioned example is the case of group theory. The properties of group-theoretical structures have been probed in depth and documented for purely mathematical reasons yet these properties have also been arrived at via empirical methods and ascribed to the physical world.

One further consideration should make the effectiveness of the general point sharper. Using the above a-priori method, set theory allows us to set up any structure we like. It is a fact of the expressive power of mathematics that it can give us all the structures that satisfy any given cardinality constraint. No structure is privileged in this sense. The structural realist’s a-posteriori method guarantees that some structures are privileged over others. We choose those structures that best fit the data, etc. In the above example, this would be analogous to the fact that although arithmetic allows me to sum any two numbers, there is only one number that can be correctly ascribed to the aggregate of the two collections of physical objects under consideration.

The critic may object that the punch of Newman’s objection is that knowing only the abstract structures is not enough. But why is it not enough? Demopoulos and Friedman suggest, borrowing a concept from Quine, that without appeal to a background theory the structure cannot single out the intended from the unintended interpretations:

From a contemporary, model-theoretic standpoint, this is just the problem of intended versus unintended interpretations: Newman shows that there is always some relation, R, (on the intended domain) with structure W. But if the only constraints on something's being the intended referent of 'R' are observational and structural constraints, no such criterion for distinguishing the intended referent of 'R' can be given, so that the notion of an intended interpretation is, in Quine's phrase, provided by our background theory, and hence, cannot be a formal or structural notion in Russell's sense. (1985, 633)

Demopoulos and Friedman correctly point out that observational and structural constraints are not sufficient to determine the referent of ‘R’. Indeed, Quine argues that a background theory is required to fix the interpretation. But he also argues that this fixing is by no means absolute. For Quine, a background theory provides an interpretation for the structure of a theory by “picking a new universe for its variables of quantification to range over, and assigning objects from this universe to the names, and choosing subsets of this universe as extensions of the one-place predicates, and so on.” (1969, 53-54). Even with a background theory at hand, however, “the intended references of the names and predicates have to be learned rather by ostention, or else by paraphrase in some antecedently familiar vocabulary” (54). But, Quine goes on, “the first of these two ways has proved inconclusive” since it faces the usual problems of the indeterminacy of reference. The second of these then “is our only recourse; and such is ontological relativity” (ibid.). In other words, paraphrasing in some antecedently familiar vocabulary just brings us back to where we started for it is an appeal to another background theory. As Quine notes “[since] questions of reference of the sort we are considering make sense only relative to a background language [or theory], then evidently questions of reference for the background language make sense in turn only relative to a further background language” (ibid.). That, of course, leads to a regress. The moral of the story is that the very choice of ontology/background theory is a relative matter.

The above illustrates that Demopoulos and Friedman’s appeal to Quine, for their claim that we can avoid the problem of unintended interpretations by employing a (non-structural) background theory, lies on a serious misrepresentation of his work. Ontological relativity shows that we cannot eliminate unintended interpretations altogether i.e. we cannot uniquely pick out physical relations or indeed their relata. What we can do is impose observational and structural constraints to narrow down the number of unintended interpretations. 

Indeed, Quine draws the same epistemological lesson from this and it comes out clearly in many of his writings.​[3]​ For example in the discussion section of an article by Maxwell he makes the following comment: “One central plank in Professor Maxwell’s platform is that our knowledge of the external world consists in a sharing of structure. This is to my mind an important truth, or points towards one” (1966, 161). Also, in a more recent article he says: “The conclusion is that there can be no evidence for one ontology over against another, so long anyway as we can express a one-one correlation between them. Save the structure and you save all” (1992, 8). Hence, far from being critical of SR, as Demopoulos and Friedman have suggested, Quine’s views and especially his idea of a relativised background theory lend more credence to it. 
The claim is not that the problem of unintended interpretations does not pose an epistemic obstacle. Rather, the claim is that it is a kind of obstacle that realists can live with and, if the structural realist or Quinean is right, must live with, for there is no empirically justifiable way in which we can uniquely pick out the ontology of the world. A ‘non-structural’ realist may of course object that there are ways in which we can justifiably eliminate underdetermination altogether or at least restrict it even further by appealing to non-structural considerations. This is a legitimate reply but one which needs to be backed up by evidence. Until that happens the ‘non-structural’ realist cannot substantiate his claim that SR cannot deliver as much knowledge of the world as can be had.

6. Conclusion
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^1	  The term was coined by Grover Maxwell (1966).
^2	   Many thanks to Jeff Ketland for providing this proof. 
^3	  There are differences between Quine’s ‘global structuralism’ view and SR that are not pursued here.   
